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Abstract
This paper introduces location-based security services
and discusses a new model for tamper-resistant location
determination. These location-based security services are
demonstrated in terms of a framework for both WAP and
web-based Internet applications, which facilitates the ac-
quisition of location using the proposed model for tamper-
resistant location determination. The framework is realized
in two example applications that utilize location-based se-
curity services to enhance access control and audit facili-
ties.
1. Introduction
In recent years, an increasing amount of research and
development has been targeted at location-aware applica-
tions. These applications can be categorized into informa-
tion, tracing, resource management and navigation services.
In this paper we introduce security services as an addi-
tional category. Location-based security services facilitate
functions such as audit and access control based on the loca-
tion of a subscriber. This paper discusses how assurance of
location can be provided through tamper-resistance, as well
as detailing a method of tamper-resistance specific to GSM.
In addition, we present a framework for obtaining assured
location from a GSM phone and demonstrate the integration
of location-based security services in two common Internet
applications.
2. Location-based security services
There are numerous applications of location-based secu-
rity services, a small number of which include the enforce-
ment of export controls and software licensing, prevention
of access to confidential data, and restriction of fund trans-
fers to foreign banks based on the location of an account
holder. Security services used for applications such as these
can be categorized into two types:
1. Access Control Services: Where access is granted to
an authenticated entity based on the entity’s location;
and
2. Security Audit Services: Where security audit infor-
mation is enhanced with the location of an entity or
entities that are involved in an audited action.
Location-based authentication services may appear to be
absent, however on closer inspection it can be reasoned that
location cannot be used as an authentication metric.
A number of previous research contributions [1], [6] re-
fer to a concept of “location authentication”. The location
of an entity in no way establishes the identity of that entity,
and as such, location cannot be used for authentication in its
own right. Location authentication is in fact two distinctly
separate operations, the verification of an entity’s identity,
and authorization of an entity’s access based on their loca-
tion. Identity is typically established through a combination
of knowledge, possession and biometrics.
3. Previous work in location tamper-resistance
Using location for security services was rarely consid-
ered in the past due to the ease in which location acquisition
devices could be tampered with. Denning and MacDoran
in [1] introduced the first GPS-based location authorization
system, the “Cyber Locator”, using a patented method of
location determination [7] to provide assurance of location
integrity. This system uses raw GPS signals to derive a lo-
cation signature, where both the client and server have the
same view of satellites.
In terms of tamper-resistance, Denning and MacDoran in
[1] claim that the prediction or impersonation of a location
signature is impossible due to satellite orbit perturbations,
which are not determinable in real-time. The location sig-
nature used for authentication is only valid for 5ms, based
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on the network lag between the client and the server. While
this system may be successful at preventing replay attacks
or forgery, it is not necessarily resistant to location spoof-
ing. Kan in [5] stipulates that this system is vulnerable if
an attacker is able to record GPS satellite signals and re-
assemble the aggregate signal with the appropriate delays
for the spoofed location.
Gabber and Wool in [4] propose a number of solu-
tions for customer equipment tracking using various loca-
tion technologies including GPS and cell phones. This pa-
per identifies a number of vulnerabilities with the use of
GPS including the lack of trust of a GPS reciever, the in-
ability to detect the generation of fake satellite signals, and
the ability to easily perform low-power GPS jamming. Cel-
lular location determination is identified as a viable pos-
sibility for equipment tracking, based on their assumption
that network-calculated location can be trusted, assuming
the network infrastructure is not tampered with. A number
of attacks based on extending the transmitting antenna from
a illegitimate location to a legitimate location are discussed.
This paper does not propose any solutions to the vulnerabil-
ities that are discussed.
Subsequently, Looi in [6] proposed an “Internet chal-
lenge authentication scheme” that made use of GSM cell
phones as an authentication token for Internet-based appli-
cations. The user was authenticated by a one-time password
(OTP) sent via SMS (Short Message Service). Location
information was obtained from the phone through the en-
coded OTP response and used for access control, as well as
an enhancement to audit facilities.
The location information was calculated from the sig-
nal strengths of known neighboring BTSs (Base Transceiver
Stations) obtained from the handset. An issue with this
proposal was the ease with which the location information
could be spoofed as demonstrated by the following meth-
ods:
1. Restriction of the number of available channels:
This has the affect of significantly reducing the accu-
racy of a location calculation. The method was vali-
dated with a Nokia cell phone using the “BTS Test”
function of the Net-monitor interface. Net-monitor is
easily activated and provides a number of monitoring
functions both of the network and phone. The BTS
Test function forces the phone to only respond to a
predetermined BCCH (Broadcast Channel), thus al-
lowing the phone to use any BTS with sufficient sig-
nal strength. In the test we conducted, the phone was
forced to communicate exclusively with the further-
est BTS, resulting in a location calculation error of
3.803km.
2. Manipulation of the radio environment to affect the
RX level reported for each observed channel: This
is the easiest method to influence the location calcula-
tion. We conducted a test using aluminum foil at cer-
tain angles within close proximity to the cell phone’s
antenna, such that line-of-sight signals from the near-
est BTS were blocked. The result was a calculation
error of 1.506km.
3. Modification of the handset to provide false mea-
surements: This method of spoofing could potentially
locate the phone wherever a malicious user desires,
as long as the channels and CID reported are in the
database used for correlation. The software within the
phone would have to be modified to provide false mea-
surements to the interfaces that acquire the informa-
tion. While this method requires significantly more
effort than the previous methods, it has the ability to
yield the best results.
Location determination technology is not 100% accu-
rate. Inevitably a percentage of objects are falsely granted
or denied access to a subject due to inaccuracies in mea-
suring or obtaining the metric. Because the location infor-
mation is being used for security purposes such as access
control, the location determination technologies must ex-
hibit some form of tamper-resistance, otherwise the metric
may be deceptive in providing a false assurance of security.
Tamper-resistance of location measurements, as demon-
strated in this paper, can provide a reasonable level of assur-
ance, such that attacking or spoofing is possible only with
significant financial means and by highly motivated attack-
ers.
4. Properties of tamper-resistant measure-
ments
The purpose of tamper-resistance is to make the loca-
tion intractable, such that it is not financially viable to ma-
nipulate the location data. For location measurements to
exhibit some form of assurance, they must have properties
that make them resistant to spoofing or tampering. These
properties are used in the criteria below to form a set of pre-
requisites that must be satisfied for a location measurement
to be assured:
1. The source of the measurements used to calculate
the location must be verifiable: An example of this
property is where signal propagation timing is used to
calculate location. The origin of the signal must be
authenticated, such that a fake signal can be identified.
2. Measurements used to calculate the location must
be able to facilitate tamper detection: An example
of this property is a measurement that must be correct
in order for the device to communicate, such that a sig-
nal cannot be delayed or transmitted early in order to
Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Communication (ISCC’03) 
1530-1346/03 $17.00 © 2003 IEEE 
Authorized licensed use limited to: QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on May 23, 2009 at 18:09 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
masquerade the real distance of a MS (Mobile Station)
from a BTS. This is an inherent property of measure-
ments used for adaptive frame alignment in TDMA
(Time Division Multiple Access).
3. Measurements must be network based: These are
measurements that are obtained solely from the net-
work. If the network-based measurements are partly
based on MS functionality, this functionality must be
trusted. An example is the transmission of signal
bursts in GSM, such that timing of transmitted bursts
is as dictated by the network. A secure bootstrap could
be used to validate the software that controls the timing
of transmissions. A number of GSM chip-sets already
have this functionality built in. The use of measure-
ments obtained from a MS assume that the MS can
be trusted to make observations without modification.
Tamper-resistant MSs are outside the scope of this pa-
per, but may provide a workable solution. In the case
of network based measurements, it is assumed that the
network provider and infrastructure are trusted.
4. The location must be calculated by the network: An
example is a time difference of arrival (TDOA) calcu-
lation, where the individual arrival times of a signal
burst of an MS from a number of BTS are trilaterated
into the MS’s location. The use of an MS for loca-
tion calculations assumes that the MS can be trusted to
calculate and provide calculation results without mod-
ification. Tamper-resistant MSs are outside the scope
of this paper, but may provide a workable solution.
This criteria can also be applied to location technologies
other than GSM such as GPS. GPS fails the first criteria, as
the source of GPS signals used for calculating the location
(when using P-Code) cannot be verified. A GPS receiver is
unable to differentiate between a legitimate and fake signal
transmission. Y-Code (an encrypted version of P-code) pro-
vides such origin authentication, but is reserved exclusively
for U.S. military use. GPS also fails the third and fourth
criteria, as the location is calculated by the GPS receiver.
In GSM, the TA (Timing Advance) measurement, used
to advance the timing of a MS due to the outbound prop-
agation delay, is an example of a measurement that com-
plies with most prerequisites of the tamper-resistant mea-
surement criteria. It exhibits tamper-resistance in that it is
required for successful communication using TDMA, it is
a network-based measurement, and it is calculated by the
network operator. The exact tamper-resistant properties and
limitations of this measurement will be detailed in the fol-
lowing subsections.
4.1 TA as a tamper-resistant measurement
GSM uses TDMA to share carrier frequencies with mul-
tiple users. Each TDMA frame has 8 slots, providing each
user with the carrier frequency for 0.577ms. A time-slot has
156.25 bit periods, the last 8.25 bit periods being the guard
allowing a maximum of 8 bit periods of timing error before
an adjacent slot is corrupted.
The TA is used to adjust the timing to get the MS within
the (slot + guard) if the phone is within approximately 35km
of the BTS. The MS has to advance its timing by the round-
trip propagation time, because its time is    s off the BTS’
time due to the outbound propagation delay, and then it has
to allow for another    s for the way back.
The TA can be used to calculate the distance of the MS
from the BTS with a granularity of 550 meters, such that

TA    
      




    
, where

TA is the distance
per bit period of TA, where 1 bit period takes 3.70  s to
propagate the round-trip of BTS  MS  BTS at approx-
imately the speed of light[2]. The TA measurement is typi-
cally used to calculate the radius of an MS’s location area:
ff
TA
    ffi ! # 
  %

%
ff
TA
    ffi ' # 
 
, where

= calcu-
lated distance between MS and BTS. The distance is ) 275
meters due to the TA being rounded to the nearest bit period,
such that
  %
TA +
% # 
  
;
# 
   %
TA 
% . #  
; and
so on.
The initial TA estimation is obtained via the “Immedi-
ate Assignment” layer 3 message when the MS transmits an
access burst on the RACH (Random Access Channel). The
BTS detects a burst transmission on the RACH and mea-
sures the delay of the signal relative to the expected signal
from an MS at 0 distance. To keep track of the propagation
delay, normal bursts sent by the MS are monitored by the
BTS. Changes to the delay by more than 1 bit period result
in the advancement or retardation of the TA by 1 bit period.
The MS must time its transmissions according to signals
received from the BTS, such that transmissions measured at
the MS antenna are / 0
.  
 
(3 time-slots)
!
TA bit periods
behind the transmission received from the BTS [3]. The
accuracy of this measurement is affected by the TA being
rounded to the nearest bit period, and the tolerance of tim-
ings, which according to [3] is a maximum of ) 1 bit period.
The affects of this may be apparent near TA boundaries.
The timing advance measurement can be obtained either
from the MS or network operator and can be used to deter-
mine the distance an MS is from a given BTS. This mea-
surement is only available from the serving cell when the
MS is in active mode, although when idle the MS may be
paged without the subscriber noticing.
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4.2 Limitations of TA as a location measurement
There is one known limitation of the TA as a location
measurement. The MS must be trusted to time its trans-
missions according to signals received from the BTS, such
that transmissions measured at the MS antenna are   
   	
(3 time-slots) - TA bit periods behind the transmission re-
ceived from the BTS [3]. It is possible that MS could ad-
vance all its transmissions by dist. of MS to BTS   


bit periods.
Cellular phones/devices typically have GSM implemented
in a single chip or chip-set, where the ability to control such
parameters would not be available. Significant engineering
skills and reasonable finances would be required to perform
such an attack.
4.3. Proposed method for obtaining location with a
high level of assurance
The proposed location system uses the GCID (Global
Cell ID) and the TA measurements for calculating the loca-
tion. A number of constraints on the use of these measure-
ments are defined in this section, such that the calculated lo-
cation exhibits some properties of tamper-resistance. In ad-
dition, a different representation of the location area is used
to ensure the location provided by the system encapsulates
the entire area an MS could possibly be in. This method
provides a higher assurance of location than the commonly
used GCID-based location, as a user is able to easily spoof
their location by forcing a handover to the furtherest visible
BTS. The TA in effect ensures such activity is detected.
One of the unique features of the TA is that it must be
approximately correct in order for the MS to transmit in the
correct slot. Because transmissions must be timed such that
they arrive in the correct time-slot at the BTS, the delay
of transmissions can’t exceed the guard period, otherwise
the transmitted burst would collide with an adjacent burst.
As such, the TA must be correct beyond the guard period
otherwise transmission will be corrupted. A guard of 8.25
bit periods in effect means that the effective radius of any
cell without timing advance can be a maximum of 4400m
based on 550m per bit period. This means that locations
within this area can be undetectably spoofed.
In terms of the measurement granularity provided by TA
values, a TA measurement less than 9 cannot be assured.
The TA can be spoofed for values less than 9 due to the size
of the guards as detailed in section 4. A TA of 9 is equiv-
alent to a maximum of 4675m, which is therefore the min-
imum distance before the TA is tamper-resistant. As such,
the MS is assured of being between 0 and 4675m where
the TA is less than 9. For TA values greater than 9 and
less than 63, the MS is assured of being between 4675 and
34925m. The value of 34925m is the maximum distance
( ff 
  	 	  ffi    	
, where 63 is the maximum timing advance
supported by standard GSM [3])
In addition, the propagation path cannot be assumed to
be a direct line-of-sight as the signal may travel a longer
path. What can be assumed is that the minimum timing ad-
vance that can be obtained is the TA representing the signal
propagating the line-of-sight. This assumption holds true,
as radio waves cannot exceed the speed of light in order to
arrive at the BTS earlier.
This provides us with a fundamental grounding for
tamper-resistance, in that an MS attempting to spoof its lo-
cation from a distant location will have a timing advance
indicative of at least the minimum line-of-sight distance be-
tween the BTS and the MS  1 bit period of tolerance. As
such, a malicious user cannot spoof their location by use
of a high gain antenna or other means of extending the an-
tenna, whilst being up to 35km away from the desired BTS.
The attacks based on antenna extension described by Gab-
ber and Wool in [4] can therefore be detected by the TA
measurement.
4.4 Practical use of the TA in a location system
In order to implement a location solution based on the
proposed method, it is necessary to define a maximum al-
lowable distance from a cell. For example:
Given a cell 0001, let the maximum allowable distance from
the BTS be 4675m, such that the line-of-sight distance from
the BTS must be less than 4675m.
distmax

  
 	 
distmin   (distmin must always = 0, as any value above 0
can be spoofed)
Example 1: MStest is within defined location area
MStest: Serving Cell
    
 TA
 
 

ff
TA
 	 	  ffi    	    	 
Test: distmin 
 

distmax
    	 
  
 	 
true
Example 2: MStest is outside defined location area
MStest: Serving Cell
    
 TA
  
 

ff
TA
 	 	  ffi    	  	   	 
Test: distmin 
 

distmax
  	   	 
  
 	 
false
It is possible that the MS in example 2 was legitimate but
was adversely affected by the environment it was in. Un-
der certain circumstances, the TA will be greater than the
required minimum TA due to propagation effects in the en-
vironment of the MS. (Test results in table 1 illustrate this
effect.) In this case a potentially legitimate user will be de-
nied access. It is important to note that the TA calculation
is based on the first arrived propagation path that has a sig-
nificant RX level. The use of training sequence bits in sig-
nal bursts for equalization ensure that out of phase reflected
Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Communication (ISCC’03) 
1530-1346/03 $17.00 © 2003 IEEE 
Authorized licensed use limited to: QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY. Downloaded on May 23, 2009 at 18:09 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
signals are discarded. As such, the TA should represent the
line-of-sight propagation path in most cases.
Table 1 details trials conducted and the resulting dis-
tances. The trials involved forcing handovers on each avail-
able BTS from three defined locations. Measurements ob-
tained from each BTS were tested three times from the same
location.
Actual Range Calc. Max. Avg Calc.
Dist. of TA Dist. Range Dist.
City 1 1035 2..3 1375..1925 1742
City 2 250 1..2 825..1375 1008
City 3 2436 5..5 3025..3025 3025
City 4 1233 3..3 1925..1925 1925
City 5 489 1..1 825..825 825
Sub-A 1 1043 2..3 1375..1925 1650
Sub-A 2 1006 2..3 1375..1925 1650
Sub-A 3 2710 4..6 2475..3575* 3025
Sub-B 1 901 1..3 825..1925* 1454
  In these results, the initial Timing Advance estimate contained a timing
error less than 1 bit period. This caused the TA, after rounding, to be less
than the line-of-sight distance. This was corrected shortly after the initial
TA estimate.
Table 1. TA measurement trials.
These results have identified issues in the TA accuracy
caused by bit rounding. This tends to be an issue close to
the TA boundaries. It can be stipulated that the more time
a given BTS has to calculate the TA, more accurate it will
be. The initial TA estimate tends to be less accurate than the
TA of a MS in the same fixed location after a short period
of time has elapsed.
Location at this accuracy can be used for numerous ap-
plications including credit card transaction audits for m-
commerce applications or authorization to perform an In-
ternet banking transfer. In this case, suburb-level granular-
ity is acceptable. To increase the accuracy of the location
system, it may be necessary to perform a forced handover
onto a cell in the required area. This can be performed ei-
ther by the network operator or the MS. A forced handover
has been achieved with an Ericsson TEMS phone by mod-
ifying layer 3 measurement report messages, such that the
received signal level (RX level) reported for cells other than
the required one is 0.
This location determination method requires no changes
to current GSM infrastructure. A significant advantage of
this implementation, is that it only requires a GSM network
with the appropriate location services implemented. All the
information required for location calculation is already ob-
tainable from any LCS98 compliant location system. Our
prototype has been developed using the Ericsson Mobile
Location Solution and the MPP (Mobile Positioning Pro-
tocol) version 4.0[8].
Additional fields could be added to the MPP that quan-
tify assurance of the measurements required and returned.
For example, the initial TA estimation may be less accurate
than the TA obtained after channel establishment. Hence,
the method of obtaining the location measurement could be
adapted to accommodate the assurance level specified.
5. Location-based auditing and access control
This section discusses how location assurance mecha-
nisms can be used in security services. For audit applica-
tions, location data is comprised of the
ff
 

ffi
coordinates of
a BTS and the radius of the circular area containing a MS.
An example of an audit application is a credit card payment
protocol that adds the location of a MS to the transaction
audit. To ensure the location area is not too large, there may
optionally be an access control decision to limit the size of
the TA where closer BTSs are available.
In the case of access control, ACLs (Access Control
Lists) must contain the necessary location data to make au-
thorization decisions. An ACL is associated with every ob-
ject in a system and determines the permissions of a user or
role on a given object by the membership of that user in the
ACL.
In the proposed location-based access control system,
ACLs would contain the object ID, user/role IDs, object
permissions, and the location at which these permissions
are valid. A single ACL can have many permissions, each
with the ability to contain many location areas. A permis-
sion has a operation mode of allow or deny as denoted by
“LAC MODE” in figure 1, such that either a given permis-
sion is only valid in the associated location areas, or is valid
for all locations except the associated location areas. In this
way, access control logic of an application only grants per-
missions based on location constraints being met.
PERMISSION_ID = PERMISSION_ID
LOCATION_AREA_ID = LOCATION_AREA_ID
ACL_ID = ACL_ID PERMISSION_ID = PERMISSION_ID
ACL_ID = ACL_ID
USER_ID = USER_ID
LOCATION_AREA_ID = LOCATION_AREA_ID
COORDINATE_ID = COORDINATE_ID
USERS
USER_ID
USERNAME
USERDESCRIPTION
MSISDN
ACL
ACL_ID
OBJECT_ID
LOCATION_AREA
LOCATION_AREA_ID
DESCRIPTION
COORDINATE
COORDINATE_ID
COORDINATE_SYSTEM
X
Y
PERMISSION
PERMISSION_ID
PERMISSIONS
LAC_MODE
LOCATION_AREA_COORDINATES
COORDINATE_ID
LOCATION_AREA_ID
ACL_USERS
USER_ID
ACL_ID
ACL_PERMISSIONS
PERMISSION_ID
ACL_ID
PERMISSION_LOCATION_AREA
LOCATION_AREA_ID
PERMISSION_ID
Figure 1. ACLs for location-based access
control
Location areas associated with a permission are repre-
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sented as polygons that can contain a number of circular
location areas. These polygons define the area in which a
subject is given access to an object. Polygons can be rep-
resented in a raster-based format where location is repre-
sented as a cell in a grid, or in a vector-based format where
points are represented as
ff
 

ffi
coordinates, and polygons
as a set of
ff
 

ffi
coordinates that form a closed area.
We use a vector-based data format as it is more accurate
and can offer quick tests to determine whether the location
of a MS in inside the polygon. To test whether a given MS
location is within the defined location area, we propose a
two-step approach:
1. Determine if the BTS coordinates are inside the poly-
gon using the Jordan curve theorem.
2. Determine if the MS circular location area is within
the polygon using the equation:
ff


 loc ffi


ff



loc ffi

 

, where  loc  BTS Easting,  loc 
BTS Northing,
 
ff
  
 
TA
ffi    
This equation can be used to determine whether the
polygon intersects with the circular location area of the
MS. If not, it can be assumed that the circular location
area is within the polygon. The access control mecha-
nism can either grant or deny access to a user depend-
ing on whether the location area is within the polygon.
5.1. Securing Internet applications using location-
based access control and auditing
There are a number of prerequisites for the use of loca-
tion services, the most important of which is the associa-
tion of the location acquisition device to the corresponding
user’s session. This can be achieved by authenticating the
location acquisition device, proving that it is in the posses-
sion of a legitimate user for a given user’s session. Con-
ceptually, this method of association can operate using all
existing GSM cell phones. We propose the use of a OTP
(One Time Password) using a covert data channel, the GSM
network, to transmit the random challenge to the user.
The user who is in possession of the GSM cell phone,
enters a username and password into the their application
session to access the service. If successfully authenticated
to the application service, a random challenge is generated
by an authentication server and sent via the GSM network
to the user’s cell phone. The user then enters this random
challenge into the appropriate field in the application ses-
sion, which is subsequently verified by an authentication
server.
This method can be described in terms of two types of
services: web services and WAP (Wireless Application Pro-
tocol) services. Conceptually, the method is the same in
both types of services, however there are significant differ-
ences in implementation and network infrastructure used.
5.2. Phone association for web services
Association of a phone to a web session is particularly
important when using web services, as the session is typi-
cally not terminated at the phone, but rather at another ter-
minal. In order to associate the phone to a web session,
there must be an authentication that ties the phone to the
web session. This is done using the method described in
the previous subsection. It is assumed that web sessions are
protected by SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). Figure 2 illus-
trates how the authentication takes place.
1. Initial authentication to session: The user authenti-
cates to the service. This initial authentication prevents
malicious users from flooding a user with OTPs.
2. OTP authentication request: The web service sends
a request to the authentication server to perform au-
thentication of a given user.
3. Dispatch OTP: The authentication server retrieves the
user’s registered phone number and generates a OTP.
This OTP with the destination number is dispatched to
the SMSC (Short Message Service Center) as a class
0 SMS message for delivery to the user’s phone. A
class 0 message appears on the screen on the user’s cell
phone without any user interaction and without being
stored in the user’s SIM card.
4. User enters the OTP in the web session: When the
user receives the OTP on their cell phone, the OTP is
then typed into the appropriate authentication field of
a web page in the web session.
5. Verify OTP: The web server sends the OTP provided
by the client to the authentication server for verifica-
tion.
SMSC
Web Server
Authentication
Server
Workstation
Cell phone GSM Network
SSL Session 2. OTP Authentication
Request
5. Verify Challenge
3. Dispatch
OTP
4. Enter OTP
into Session
1. Initial
Session
Authentication
Figure 2. Phone association using SMS as a
bearer for a one time password.
This process provides some assurance that the user who
is using a web session is the same user that possesses the
phone. When the location of this device is obtained, one can
be reasonably satisfied that the located phone is the same
phone that was authenticated.
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5.3. Phone association for WAP services
A WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) session has
the advantage that the communications endpoint is in the
phone. Because of this, it is possible to mutually authen-
ticate the web server and phone for the purposes of asso-
ciation establishment. This option however, requires a cell
phone that supports WAP 2.0 / TLS (Transport Layer Secu-
rity) tunneling, and a SWIM (Subscriber Wireless Identity
Module).
A SWIM is a SIM and a WIM (Wireless Identity Mod-
ule) integrated, containing an anonymous random public
key pair, certified by the network operator. It is used in
authentication for TLS/WTLS and application level secu-
rity functions such as authentication and non-repudiation
operations[9].
Without support for a SWIM, mutual authentication of a
TLS session is not possible. At the time this paper was writ-
ten, there were few phones on the market with this function-
ality. In addition, none of the Australian network operators
were distributing SWIMs.
Because of the lack of support of these WAP features,
an alternate method of association was needed. As such,
the method of association proposed for web services was
modeled to work in a WAP environment. Figure 3 illustrates
how the authentication takes place in a WAP environment.
1. Initial authentication to session: The user authenti-
cates to the service. This initial authentication prevents
malicious users from flooding a user with OTPs (one
time passwords).
2. OTP authentication: The web service sends a request
to the authentication server to perform authentication
of a given user.
3. Dispatch WAP push message containing OTP: The
authentication server retrieves the user’s registered
phone number, IP or other addressing entry and then
generates a WAP push message containing a OTP and
associated WML(Wireless Markup Language) Script
to facilitate forwarding of the OTP. This message is
dispatched to the WAP push gateway for delivery to
the user’s phone.
4. User accepts the WAP push message: When the user
receives the WAP push message, it prompts the user to
authenticate to the service. Once approved, the OTP is
sent to the WAP web server via HTTP Post.
5. Verify challenge: The web server sends the OTP pro-
vided by the client’s phone to the authentication server
for verification.
The following subsections detail example implementa-
tions of location-based auditing and access control.
WAP Push
Gateway
WAP Web
Server
Authentication
Server
Cell phone GSM Network
2. OTP Authentication
Request
5. Verify Challenge
3. Dispatch WAP Push
OTP Message
4. Accept
WAP Push Msg
WAP
Proxy / Gateway
SSL
Session
1. Initial Session
Authentication
5. OTP
Figure 3. Phone association using WAP push
as a bearer for a one time password.
5.4. Credit card audit example
There are many proprietary fraud protection technolo-
gies available from a multitude of credit card vendors, how-
ever many of these fail because of the number of different
technologies merchants must support and the lack of sup-
port by the majority of merchants. This results in no benefit
in terms of protecting a persons credit card from fraud, both
in terms of revenue protection for credit card companies and
for the credit card holder.
Location auditing is independent of credit cards and their
associated systems. Location auditing can provide credit
card companies and merchants with a new level of revenue
protection that works over all credit cards as well as other
payment types. This technology is particularly useful in m-
commerce applications, where cell phones are already being
used in a transaction.
The basis of this system is the attachment of location data
to a credit card transaction. Location data must be certified
by a third party such as a network operator and stored by
the merchant, or a trusted third party that is entrusted to
perform the location acquisitions, requiring users register
with the third party.
The centralized model is the easiest to realize and also
provides better support for user location privacy. A user
can simply register with the service and the merchant can
invoke the service for a credit card transaction. The loca-
tion audit proves that a user made a transaction in a given
location area. If credit card fraud occurs, it is then up to the
credit card holder to prove that they were not in the audited
location.
The current Internet credit card system, based entirely
on a credit card number and expiry, provides no proof that
a credit card holder who claims they possess the credit card
number and expiry is the credit card owner. This is tradi-
tionally assured by a signature. In effect, the merchant has
no basis other that a possible delivery address to defend a
disputed payment. While this system is advantageous to
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merchants and credit card companies, it may not be so at-
tractive to credit card holders. Incentives could be offered
such that credit card holders who register qualify for a re-
duced interest rate for example.
5.5. Internet banking example
Internet banking is a common and popular Internet ap-
plication that could significantly benefit from location ac-
cess control and audit. An example of banking functionality
that location-based access control logic could be added to is
internal and external fund transfers. Table 2 shows some
hypothetical high-level permissions for transfers based on
location constraints and a phone-session association.
Location information Permissions
No cell phone Account balance and transaction
history information only
Cell phone association, and lo-
cation acquisition unavailable
Ability to transfer between the
user’s accounts only
Cell phone association, and in
unregistered location area
Ability to transfer up to $500 to any
bank account
Cell phone association, and in
registered location area
Ability to transfer up to transfer
limit ($50,000) to any bank account
Table 2. Account transfer access control in-
fluenced by location.
The association status is also used as a constraint in
that the cell phone association better establishes the iden-
tity of the Internet banking user. The association provides
2-factor authentication of the user as well as authenticating
the phone.
A user who is in an incorrect location must already have
a cell phone association in order for the location to be used.
As such, the permissions assigned to cell phone association
are combined with that of “unregistered” and “registered”
location. It is possible that the location can not be obtained
even though the user has successfully associated the phone
to the session.
Due to the potential cost and performance overhead of
obtaining the location information from the network oper-
ator on a continual basis, it is envisaged that the user’s lo-
cation would be obtained once during a session to deter-
mine the session permissions, and then for each transaction
to validate the operation is still valid. The location obtained
for each transaction will also serve as a location audit for
the transaction.
An access control scheme such as this is very cost effec-
tive in providing enhanced security through the use of cell
phone association (two factor authentication) and location
access control and audit, in that no costly tokens or equip-
ment needs to be issued from the bank. The only cost is
SMS / WAP Push messages and location requests.
6. Conclusion
This paper has introduced location-based security ser-
vices and the requirement for tamper-resistant location ser-
vices. A new model for tamper-resistant location acquisi-
tion using GSM cell phones has been demonstrated and re-
lated to two types of security services, location-based access
control and audit. It also has provided a basic set of crite-
ria from which future research into 3rd generation cellular
location and other location technologies can be pursued. In
addition, a framework for implementing these services in
both web and WAP Internet applications has been detailed,
discussing two example applications for which location-
based security services could be used.
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